The history of Hezbollah, from Israel to Syria

In July 2006, long-standing tensions flared into war when Hezbollah operators crossed into Israel, killed three soldiers and abducted two others. Israel responded with a furious spate of air strikes on Lebanon, where Hezbollah is based, and violence soon swept the country, less than two decades after the population had emerged from its own civil war.

That summer, conflict between the two sides ripped through Lebanon's recovering infrastructure and displaced almost a quarterof its people.

Israel has launched wars on Lebanon and Hezbollah many times, often in the southern swath of land that Israel carved out of the country and deemed a security zone during its long occupation throughout the 1980s and 90s. 

The zone, which at one point grew to 10 percent of Lebanese territory, endured past the end of Lebanon's civil war and generated frequent, bloody confrontations. Before Israel withdrew in 2000, Hezbollah carried out a dozen "self-martyrdom missions" on Israeli military targets; in 1996, the Israeli army launched a campaign that led to the massacre of civilians at a United Nations base in Qana. 

Compared with the hostile decades of the security zone, the summer war was a short blip on the historical record: 33 days of destruction that punctuated each side's longer struggle against the simple fact of the other's existence.

Both Israel and Hezbollah claimed 2006 as a victory at first, yet it was clear that for Hezbollah the gains extended beyond the war zone's borders. Across the Arab world, citizens had been watching from afar as Israel's bombing of bridges and shelters locked Lebanese communities into a grinding summer siege.

In the book Hezbollah: A Short History, scholar Augustus Richard Norton notes how outrage quickly spread over Israel's military approach, termed the Dahiya doctrine for the neighbourhoods that Israel flattened across Lebanon's south. By late July, angry demonstrations were mushrooming across Egypt. 

In Syria and Palestine, posters, bumper stickers and keychains blared strong messages of support for Hezbollah's soldiers. The group had become a regional anti-hero, exiting the war with a newfound cache of sympathy across the region.

"After the war in 2006, Hezbollah reached the peak of its popularity,"said Amer Sabaileh, a political analyst from the Washington-based Middle East Media and Policy Studies Institute. "[It] had the consensus of people when it came to resistance, credibility and speaking the truth."

Yet today, Hezbollah is in flux. Once a champion of Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, the group's popularity in the Middle East hovers at a new low due to its association with Bashar al-Assad's embattled regime in Syria. In a 2015 Zogby poll, 96 percent of Egyptians agreedthat Hezbollah has contributed to growing regional extremism. 

Other Arab countries have joined the chorus of disapproval, with 86 percent of polled Jordanians holding a negative view of Hezbollah.

As Hezbollah wages its new, more unpopular war in Syria, Lebanon's past summer conflict is once again surfacing to political relevance. Last July, a Hezbollah-affiliated TV channel released a documentary titled 2006 about the group's war against Israel. The series showed never-before-seen footage of Hezbollah operations, as well as interviews with high-ranking Israeli officials who were apparently tricked into appearing on camera.

Political forces often turn to the past to sow legitimacy. For Hezbollah, the documentary harkens back to a point in time when the group enjoyed widespread legitimacy, and its violence could be framed in easier, Arab v Israeli terms. 

According to Sahar Atrache, the International Crisis Group's senior Lebanon analyst, Hezbollah has always worked to knit tenuous associations between the legitimacy it garnered in 2006, and its current, more polarising involvement in Syria.

"From the beginning, Hezbollah has tried to link the fight in Syria to Israel," she said. "It has kept saying that Syria's part of the same axis of resistance to Israel, and that the aim of the war in Syria … is a continuation of the war of 2006. Hezbollah keeps constantly going back to Israel; it's something that's very recurrent in its speeches and party narrative."

For so long, Hezbollah has set its legitimacy against the backdrop of Israel's regional unpopularity. Today, however, the group is seeing its resources drained by Syria's war, and is in need of a new raison d'etre to bolster this costly involvement. It will be the responsibility of the enigmatic Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah to deliver.

Nasrallah is a polarising figure. For many, he possesses an undeniable reserve of charisma, despite his leading role in what several international bodies have classified as a terrorist organisation. 

Born one of nine children, Nasrallah's early childhood in East Beirut is cloaked in political mythology. He is said to have been pious from an early age, often taking long walks to the city centre to find second-hand books on Islam. Nasrallah himself has described how his childhood free time was spent staring reverently at a portrait of the famous Shia cleric Musa al-Sadr - a pastime that foreshadowed his future concern with politics and Shia communities in Lebanon.

In 1974, Sadr founded an organisation - the Movement of the Deprived - that became the ideological kernel for the well-known Lebanese party and Hezbollah rival, Amal. Grown into a political heavyweight in the 1980s, Amal mined support from middle-class Shia who had grown frustrated with the sect's historic marginalisation in Lebanon. Besides commandeering an anti-establishment message, Amal also provided stable income to many Shia families, unfurling a complex system of patronage across Lebanon's south.

After the outbreak of civil war between Lebanon's Christian Maronites and Muslims, Nasrallah joined Amal's movement and fought with its militia. But as the conflict progressed, Amal adopted a staunchly unsympathetic stance towards the presence of Palestinian militias in Lebanon, and it was from opposition to this sentiment that Hezbollah emerged. 

Nourished by a steady lifeline of Iranian military support, Hezbollah's revolutionary ideology attracted many Amal defectors, among them a young Nasrallah, fresh out of his stay at a Shia seminary in Iraq. By 1985, Hezbollah had crystallised its own dogma in a founding document, which addressed the "downtrodden of Lebanon" and named the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran as its one true leader.

Throughout the civil war, Hezbollah and Amal evolved in bitter tandem, often jostling with each other for support among Lebanon's Shia constituents. As Norton notes in his book, political alliances in Lebanon's Shia communities have never been rigid. Personal allegiances change over the course of a lifetime; families often become messy sites of overlap, with members of the same household supporting different groups. Indeed, Nasrallah's brother, Hussein, has been a lifelong member of Amal.

Championing the Palestinian cause as its own, Hezbollah expanded during the Lebanese civil war under a shadow of kidnappings, hijackings and violence. The group abducted dozens of foreigners and leveraged them in complex negotiations that muddled their interests with Iran's. It drove bomb-laden trucks to US targets in Lebanon, and killed hundreds of people, both abroad and at home: Until 9/11, Hezbollah had taken more American lives than any other US-deemed terrorist groups.